












about	the	exemplary	representational	notion	that	is	the	sign?2	For	Michel	Foucault	repre-sentation	is	the	key	feature	of	the	classical	account	of	the	sign	(Foucault	2002:	72),	and,	from	Aristotle	treating	words	as	conventionally	determined	signs	of	affections	of	the	soul	(De	interpretatione,	16a1-29)3	through	to	Charles	Sanders	Peirce’s	account	of	signs	as	rep-resentations	(Peirce	1998a:	5)	and	Ludwig	Wittgenstein’s	suggestion	that	signs	may	only	be	alive	in	their	use	(Wittgenstein	2009:	§432),	there	seems	to	be	little	in	the	way	of	re-sources	in	the	history	of	philosophy	for	detaching	signs	from	a	dependent	role	of	repre-senting	 something	 beyond	 themselves.4	 Moreover,	 the	 dominant	 theory	 of	 signs	 that	Deleuze	and	Guattari	 faced	 in	their	 time	was	that	of	Ferdinand	de	Saussure,	 for	whom	«sign»	named	an	inseparable	coupling	of	signifier	and	signified	(Saussure	2011:	67).	This	makes	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	notion	of	«a-signifying	semiotics»	seem	like	an	oxymoron:	how	could	semiotics,	the	study	of	signs,	proceed	without	a	concern	for	how	these	signs	signify?	What	is	a	sign	if	it	does	not	signify?	Equally,	sign	and	rhythm	may	seem	an	unlikely	pairing.	Take,	for	instance,	the	work	of	Henri	Meschonnic.	Meschonnic	is	a	theorist	who	at	first	glance	seems	closely	aligned	with	Deleuze	 and	Guattari,	 not	 only	 through	 developing	 his	 own	 critique	 of	 representation	(Meschonnic	2011:	43),	but	furthermore	in	aligning	this	critique	with	a	theory	of	rhythm	that	 challenges	and	exceeds	 traditional	definitions:	 against	 the	 common	association	of	rhythm	with	meter,	order,	and	proportion,	Meschonnic	aims	to	revive	a	Heraclitean	no-tion	of	rhythm	as	continuous	flow	(Meschonnic	2011:	140),	an	affective,	transformative,	pluralistic	rhythm	(Meschonnic	2011:	54).5	But	not	only	is	Meschonnic’s	understanding	of	rhythm	«irreducible	to	the	sign»	(Meschonnic	1981:	705),	there	is	moreover	a	«con-flict»,	even	«war»	(Meschonnic	2011:	81),	between	rhythm	and	sign,	between	«continuum	and	discontinuum,	against	 the	unthought	and	commonplace	 ideas»	(Meschonnic	2011:	62).	For	Meschonnic	the	sign	is	the	representation	of	language,	and	a	representation	that	presents	 itself	 not	 as	 a	 representation	 but	 as	 the	 «nature	 and	 truth»	 of	 language	(Meschonnic	2011:	66).	This	is	enacted	through	a	dualism	that	assumes	and	asserts	a	split	–	of	signifier	and	signified,	 form	and	content,	mind	and	body	(Meschonnic	2011:	43)	–	where	 the	 representation	of	 language	 stands	over	 and	 above	 language	 itself.	 The	 sign	names	everything	that	is	dead	in	language	(Meschonnic	2011:	83),	everything	that	puts	a	stop	to	movement,	and	to	pay	heed	to	rhythm,	for	Meschonnic,	is	to	undermine	this	split	




that	the	sign	marks,	to	recover	the	continuity	beneath	discontinuity	and	with	it	the	life	of	language.	Meschonnic’s	critique	of	the	sign	is	familiar	across	French	thought	in	the	second	half	of	the	 twentieth-century,	 where	 a	 rejection	 of	 the	 Saussurean	 sign	 accompanies	 the	widespread	 break	 with	 structuralism	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1960s.6	 But	 it	 highlights	 the	question	of	why	Deleuze	and	Guattari	seem	to	find	in	the	sign	a	significant	spur	to	thought,	as	well	as	the	problem	of	how	the	seemingly	conflicting	notions	of	sign	and	rhythm	are	to	be	drawn	together.	If	their	theory	of	rhythm	is	a	theory	of	signs,	by	common	conceptions	of	the	sign	it	is	scarcely	recognisable	as	such.	Indeed,	James	Williams	has	suggested	that	Deleuze	 «never	 develops	 a	 full	 philosophy	 of	 the	 sign»	 (Williams	 2016:	 120),	 and	moreover	 that	 «it	 is	hard	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 sign	 is	 crucial	 to	 his	meta-physics»	(Williams	2016:	121).	While	I	will	dispute	Williams’s	latter	claim,	I	agree	that	we	cannot	say	that	either	Deleuze	or	Guattari	has	a	«philosophy	of	 the	sign»,	and	that	we	rather	find	across	their	work	a	set	of	diverse	inquiries	that	do	not	have	any	immediately	cohesive	 character.	 But	 I	 take	 this	 plurality	 to	 be	 a	 positive	 characteristic	of	 their	 en-gagement	 with	 signs,	 and	 believe	 that	 the	 figure	 of	 rhythm	 provides	 a	 means	 to	 ac-commodate	such	a	semiotic	pluralism.	To	lay	the	groundwork	for	the	Deleuzo-Guattarian	semiorhythmology	I	propose	I	will	begin	with	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	earlier	inquiries	into	signs,	and	work	forward	towards	exploring	how	these	are	manifest	in	A	Thousand	Plateaus.	I	will	start	by	considering	how	Deleuze,	first	in	1964’s	Proust	and	Signs	(2008)	and	then	elaborated	in	1968’s	Difference	
and	Repetition	(1994),	conceives	of	the	sign	as	something	like	a	site	or	source	of	encoun-ter.7	Following	this	I	will	track	Guattari’s	thought	on	signs	from	his	early	elaborations	on	Lacanian	thought	through	to	his	progressive	development,	following	the	1972	publication	of	Anti-Oedipus	(1983),	of	a	«mixed	semiotic»,	proposed	as	an	alternative	to	the	Saussur-ean	theory	of	the	sign.	I	will	show	that	the	most	theoretically	profound	outcome	of	this	is	a	radically	revised	version	of	Charles	Sanders	Peirce’s	notion	of	the	diagram,	which	moti-vates	much	of	both	Guattari’s	and	Deleuze’s	thought	to	come.	I	will	suggest	that	in	A	Thou-
sand	Plateaus	these	two	strands	of	inquiry	are	drawn	into	conjunction	with	a	biosemiotics	outlined	through	a	Spinozist	reading	of	the	early	twentieth-century	ethologist	Jakob	von	Uexküll,	all	of	which	together	allow	for	the	construction	of	the	concept	of	the	refrain,	the	modulating,	 rhythmic	 assemblage	 which	 draws	 diverse	 semiotic	 practices	 into	 con-sistency.	What	I	set	out	here	is	only	a	sketch	of	a	set	of	engagements	with	signs	each	of	










(2006a),	from	two	years	earlier.	Following	Nietzsche,	Deleuze	states	that	«[t]he	whole	of	philosophy	is	a	symptomatology,	and	a	semiology»	(Deleuze	2006a:	3).8	On	this	account	a	phenomenon	«is	not	an	appearance	or	even	an	apparition	but	a	sign,	a	symptom	which	finds	its	meaning	in	an	existing	force»,	and	to	engage	with	signs	is	to	interpret	forces.	The	impact	of	 such	a	Nietzscheanism	can	be	heard	 in	 several	ways	 throughout	Proust	and	
Signs,	as	in	the	echo	of	Nietzsche’s	discussion	in	The	Gay	Science	of	a	«sign-world»	«de-based	 to	 its	 lowest	 common	denominator»	 (Nietzsche	 2001:	 §354)	when	Deleuze	 de-scribes	 the	«stupid»	and	«stereotyped»	worldly	 signs	of	high	 society,	 characterised	by	their	«vacuity»	(Deleuze	2006:	5).	Pierre	Klossowski	likewise	took	Nietzsche’s	philoso-phy,	especially	in	its	early	years,	to	be	a	«combat	against	culture»,	that	is,	the	world	of	signs,	and	argues	that	in	opposition	to	this	culture	of	signs	Nietzsche	ultimately	proposed	a	«culture	of	affects»	(Klossowski	1997:	14).	With	Klossowski's	thought	on	Nietzsche	de-veloping	in	parallel	and	in	dialogue	with	Deleuze’s	own,	Klossowski’s	suggestion	that	this	«culture	of	affects»	concerns	a	«semiotic	of	impulses»	(Klossowski	1997:	15)	is	suggestive	of	how	Deleuze	can	take	Nietzsche	as	the	source	for	a	radically	non-Saussurean	theory	of	signs.9	Four	years	later,	Difference	and	Repetition	seems	to	confirm	this	reading,	with	the	open-ing	pages	announcing	Nietzsche	as	a	thinker	concerned	with	«put[ting]	metaphysics	in	motion,	in	action	…	producing	within	the	work	a	movement	capable	of	affecting	the	mind	outside	of	 all	 representation	…	of	 substituting	direct	 signs	 for	mediate	 representations»	(Deleuze	1994:	8,	my	emphasis).10	Again,	as	in	Proust	and	Signs,	signs	are	associated	with	learning,	 and	 learning,	 as	 before,	 is	 not	 conceived	 of	 simply	 as	 the	passage	 from	non-knowledge	to	knowledge,	the	discovery	of	solutions,	laws,	and	generalities	that	then	dis-solve	the	problems	they	pertained	to	(Deleuze	1994:	164).	Learning	rather	names	«the	subjective	 acts	 carried	 out	 when	 one	 is	 confronted	 with	 the	 objecticity	 of	 a	 problem	(Idea)»,	not	an	act	of	recognition	but	rather	the	explication	of	an	internal	difference	that	no	given	solution	can	eliminate.	And	again	learning	is	associated	with	signs,	where	it	is	said	that	learning	«takes	place	not	in	the	relation	between	a	representation	and	an	action	(reproduction	of	the	Same)	but	in	the	relation	between	a	sign	and	a	response	(encounter	with	the	Other)»	(Deleuze	1994:	22).	Here	Deleuze	outlines	a	more	thorough,	metaphysical	account	of	signs,	remarking	that	they	involve	heterogeneity	«in	at	least	three	ways»:		




first,	in	the	object	which	bears	or	emits	them,	and	is	necessarily	on	a	different	level,	as	though	there	were	two	orders	of	size	or	disparate	realities	between	which	the	sign	flashes;	secondly,	 in	 themselves,	 since	a	sign	envelops	another	«object»	within	 the	limits	of	 the	object	which	bears	 it,	and	 incarnates	a	natural	or	spiritual	power	(an	Idea);	finally,	in	the	response	they	elicit,	since	the	movement	of	the	response	does	not	«resemble»	that	of	the	sign.	(Deleuze	1994:	22-23)		Again	the	sign	is	not	reducible	to	either	object	or	subject,	not	only	working	across	them	but	producing	the	terms	that	are	retroactively	named	as	a	subject-object	relation.	Learn-ing	is	not	imitation	but	rather	practical	engagement,	and	teachers	are	not	those	who	say	«do	as	I	do»	but	rather	those	who	say	«do	with	me».	Deleuze	uses	the	example	of	swim-ming,	where	 learning	to	swim	is	not	primarily	a	case	of	 imitating	an	 instructor,	nor	of	imitating	the	movement	of	the	water,	but	rather	involves	staging	an	encounter	with	the	movement	of	the	water	around	us,	of	«grasping»	it	«in	practice	as	signs».	To	learn	is	«to	constitute	this	space	of	an	encounter	with	signs»;	in	other	words,	to	open	ourselves	to	a	disorienting,	alien	outside,	to	immerse	ourselves	in	a	problem	(such	as	the	swimmer	with	the	problem	of	the	sea),	to	place	the	relations	that	constitute	our	bodies	into	relation	with	the	relations	that	constitute	the	problem,	and	to	give	consistency	to	the	new	field	this	then	constitutes.11	Where	 the	account	of	signs	 in	Difference	and	Repetition	 seems	 to	expand	on	 that	of	
Proust	and	Signs	is	in	extensively	accounting	for	the	ontological	and	epistemological	level	at	which	encounters	with	signs	take	place,	and	this	is	thematised	through	the	notion	of	sensation.	Deleuze	takes	the	concern	of	the	«transcendental	empiricism»	he	affirms	to	be	«apprehend[ing]	directly	in	the	sensible	that	which	can	only	be	sensed,	the	very	being	of	the	sensible»	(Deleuze	1994:	57-58).	«That	which	can	only	be	sensed»	names	the	primary	characteristic	of	the	encounter,	an	encounter	not	of	something	recognised	and	readily	un-derstood	but	of	«[s]omething	in	the	world»	that	«forces	us	to	think»	(Deleuze	1994:	139).	The	object	of	this	encounter	is	the	sign	(Deleuze	1994:	140):	it	is	the	sign	that	forces	us	to	think,	that	«cause[s]	problems»	(Deleuze	1994:	164).		In	 outlining	 this	 conception	 of	 the	 encounter	 Deleuze	 begins	 with	 Plato,	 who	 for	Deleuze	is	an	exception	in	the	history	of	philosophy	in	not	subordinating	apprenticeship	to	 knowledge	 (Deleuze	 1994:	 166)	 and	 in	 establishing	 a	 temporal	 notion	 of	 thought	(Deleuze	1994:	142).	But	Plato,	on	Deleuze’s	account,	does	not	yet	capture	the	«being	of	the	sensible».	For	this	Deleuze	must	turn	to	biology,	and	it	is	in	linking	signs	and	habitua-tion	that	the	primacy	of	sensation	becomes	clear.	Deleuze	remarks	on	how	«[e]very	or-ganism,	in	its	receptive	and	perceptual	elements,	but	also	its	viscera,	is	a	sum	of	contrac-tions,	of	retentions	and	expectations»	(Deleuze	1994:	73),	a	«primary	vital	sensibility»	through	which	behaviour	is	developed	and	enacted	in	relation	to	a	domain	of	encountered	




signs.	On	Deleuze’s	account	of	the	organism,	«[t]he	whole	domain	of	behaviour,	the	inter-twining	of	artificial	and	natural	signs,	the	intervention	of	instinct	and	learning,	memory	and	intelligence,	shows	how	the	questions	involved	in	contemplation	are	developed	in	the	form	of	active	problematic	fields»	(Deleuze	1994:	78).	But	while	in	this	account	Deleuze	refers	 primarily	 to	 the	 purely	 historical	 and	 philosophical	 resources	 of	 Bergson	 and	Hume,	in	fact	the	importance	of	the	physical	sciences	to	Deleuze’s	thinking	of	signs	is	man-ifest	here	in	his	reliance,	at	this	point	often	unacknowledged,	on	the	philosophy	of	modern	science	developed	by	Gilbert	Simondon.	Deleuze	does	 credit	 Simondon	 for	showing	«that	 individuation	presupposes	a	prior	metastable	state»	(Deleuze	1994:	246),	and	cites	here	the	significance	of	Simondon’s	con-cept	of	«disparateness»,	or	disparation,	the	notion	that	it	is	a	disparity	between	two	or-ders	brought	into	relation	that	motivates	the	process	of	individuation.	But	Deleuze’s	reg-ular	mentions	of	disparity	across	Difference	and	Repetition	should	all	be	read	with	Simon-don	in	mind,	as	when	he	defines	«signal»	as	a	«system	with	orders	of	disparate	size»	and	«sign»	as	«what	happens	within	such	a	system,	what	 flashes	across	the	 intervals	when	communication	takes	place	between	disparates»	(Deleuze	1994:	20).12	With	these	defini-tions	Deleuze	 seems	 to	name	as	his	 «sign»	what	Simondon	calls	 a	 «signal»	 (Simondon	2005:	257),	and	what	the	sign	does	when	it	is	forcing	thought	is	expose	thought	to	the	«coexistence	of	contraries»	(Deleuze	1994:	141).	For	Deleuze,	as	for	Simondon,	«[e]very	phenomenon	refers	to	an	inequality	by	which	it	is	conditioned.	Every	diversity	and	every	change	refers	to	a	difference	which	is	its	sufficient	reason»	(Deleuze	1994:	222).	The	con-dition	for	anything	appearing,	being	actualised	or	presented	as	a	solution	to	a	problem,	is	disparity,	and	the	sign	spans	this	disparity,	 the	shock	to	thought	 that	 it	 forces,	and	the	solutions	produced.		That	Simondon	allows	Deleuze	to	elaborate	and	expand	the	Nietzschean	theory	of	signs	of	Proust	and	Signs	 through	a	 (perhaps	still	 fledgling)	materialist	 account	of	sensation	then	sets	the	conditions	for	Deleuze	to	ultimately	be	able	to	bring	this	theory	of	signs	into	contact	with	the	semiotics	 that	Guattari	had	at	 the	same	time	made	tentative	steps	to-wards,	and	that	he	continued	to	develop	across	the	1970s.	I	will	now	turn	to	that	work.			
Guattari’s	semiotic	inquiries		Prior	to	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	Anti-Oedipus,	Guattari’s	most	significant	attempt	to	the-orise	signs	was	«From	One	Sign	to	the	Other»,	originally	a	letter	to	Lacan	written	in	1961	and	published	in	article	form	in	1966.	Guattari	takes	the	autonomy	and	priority	that	Lacan	assigns	to	the	signifier	over	the	signified	(Lacan	2006:	415)	as	permission	to	develop	a	wildly	creative	and	expansive	approach	to	signs,	a	move	that	Guattari	only	later	realised	




marked	a	significant	departure	from	Lacan	(Guattari	2006:	34).	In	this	text	Guattari	set	himself	the	ambitious	task	of	discovering	a	«prototype	of	the	sign	that	would	be	able	to	account	 for	 all	 creation	 on	 its	 own»	 (Guattari	 2015:	 185).	 Among	 the	 diverse	 lines	 of	thought	Guattari	develops,	the	notion	that	most	persists	in	his	work	is	that	of	the	«point-sign»,	at	this	time	a	functionally	undividable	entity	engendered	by	two	«splotches»	which	by	themselves	do	not	yet	constitute	signifying	material.	Three	of	these	point-signs	make	up	a	«basic	sign»,	which	can	be	enchained	and	encoded	into	complex	semiotic	systems	(Guattari	2015:	184).13	The	notion	of	the	point-sign	drops	out	of	Guattari’s	writings	until	it	is	reformulated,	in	his	preparatory	texts	for	Anti-Oedipus,	as	the	Nietzschean	«power-sign»	(Guattari	2006:	224),	which	 itself	does	not	appear	 in	Anti-Oedipus,	where	«points-signs»	 receive	occa-sional	reference	but	little	elaboration.	For	the	remainder	of	the	1970s,	however,	Guattari	devotes	a	large	part	of	his	work	to	re-theorising	signs	and	semiotics.	This	direction	had	been	hinted	at	early	in	his	preparations	for	Anti-Oedipus	when	he	remarks	that	«I	think	it’s	with	Hjelmslev,	maybe	 Peirce»	 (Guattari	2006:	38)	 that	 the	key	 to	departing	 from	structuralism	lies.	A	concern	with	Peirce’s	notions	of	the	diagram	and	diagrammatization	appears	throughout	these	writings,	where	the	power-sign	is	equated	with	a	«diagramma-tization	of	the	sign»	(Guattari:	46)	and	associated	with	a	«deterritorialized	polyvocality»	(Guattari	2006:	72).	This	signals	that,	unlike	Deleuze	up	to	this	point,	Guattari	is	keen	to	develop	his	inquiries	into	signs	with	some	traditional	semiotic	theories	in	mind.		Peirce,	despite	his	founding	role	in	semiotics,	is	nevertheless	a	somewhat	unconven-tional	figure	in	that	field.	His	tripartite	division	of	signs	into	icons,	indexes,	and	symbols	(Peirce	1998a:	5)	contrasts	with	the	binaries	that	operate	across	structuralist	accounts,	and	his	minimal	definition	of	a	sign	as	being	«something	which	stands	to	somebody	for	something	in	some	respect	or	capacity»	(Peirce	1931-35:	2.228)	offers	a	flexibility	and	open-endedness	that	few	other	accounts	do.	But	here	already	Guattari	suggests	a	distinc-tion	from	Peirce	by	speaking	of	«a	passage	from	iconization	to	diagrammatization»	(Guat-tari	2006:	77),	a	formulation	that	could	make	little	sense	to	a	Peirce	for	whom	the	diagram	is	 a	 type	of	 icon.	For	Peirce	each	of	 the	 types	of	 icon	–	 image,	metaphor,	 and	diagram	(Peirce	 1931-35:	 2.277)	 –	 operate	 through	 a	 relation	 of	 resemblance.	 Guattari	 would	agree	with	regards	to	the	image	and	the	metaphor,	but	he	finds	something	different	at	work	in	the	diagram.	That	Guattari	then	turns	the	diagram	to	political	ends,	in	a	passage	entitled	«Icons	and	Class	Struggle»	(Guattari	2006:	188),	begins	to	suggest	why.	For	Guattari,	signification	has	an	immediately	political	character.	Against	standard	un-derstandings	of	the	signifier-signified	relation	as	«arbitrary»	(Saussure	2011:	67)	or	«con-ventional»	(Peirce	1998a:	9),	Guattari	argues	that	this	relation	is	«at	root	merely	the	ex-pression	of	 authority	by	means	of	 signs»	 (Guattari	1984b:	88).	Guattari	 contends	 that	




meaning	does	not	come	from	language	itself,	but	rather	from	«very	real	social	power	for-mations»	(Guattari	1984c:	169),	and	he	speaks	of	a	«linguistic	machine»	that	serves	to	systematise	and	structure	these	power	formations.	To	remain	at	the	level	of	language	is	to	avoid	questioning	the	operations	of	power	that	underlie	it	(Guattari	1984b:	82).	At	is-sue	for	Guattari,	then,	is	that	approaches	that	make	signification,	language,	or	the	symbolic	primary	do	not	and	cannot	adequately	account	for	the	real	diversity	of	semiotic	systems,	and	he	suggests	that	«[o]ne	type	of	meaning	 is	produced	by	the	semiotics	of	 the	body,	another	by	the	semiotics	of	power	(of	which	there	are	many),	 yet	another	by	machine	semiotics»	(Guattari	1984c:	164).	In	short,	Guattari	is	challenging	methods	that	suppose	the	adequacy	of	a	single	semiotic	–	specifically	that	of	signification	–	and	raising	the	ques-tion	of	by	what	means	a	single	semiotic	can	be	seen	to	unify	diverse	semiotic	systems,	«where	all	other	poly-centred	semiotic	substances	can	become	dependent	on	a	single	spe-cial	stratum	of	the	signifier»	(Guattari	1984a:	75).	The	new	role	of	analysis	then	becomes	a	matter	of	mapping	«the	non-signifying	semi-otic	dimensions	underling,	 illuminating,	and	deconstructing	every	discourse»	(Guattari	1984b:	104).	But	the	question	remains	of	what	it	could	mean	for	a	semiotics	to	be	non-signifying	or	a-signifying.14	Considering	Peirce’s	division	of	signs	will	be	useful	here,	and	will	suggest	why	and	how	Guattari	 turns	to	 the	diagram.	Peirce	distinguishes	between	three	kinds	of	signs:	first,	likenesses,	or	icons;	second,	indications,	or	indices;	and	third,	symbols,	or	general	signs	(Peirce	1998a:	5).	Icons	«serve	to	convey	ideas	of	the	things	they	represent	simply	by	imitating	them»,	indices	«show	something	about	things,	on	account	of	 their	being	physically	connected	with	them»,	and	symbols	«have	become	associated	with	their	meanings	by	usage».	It	is	perhaps	not	quite	right	to	say	that	these	are	classes	of	signs	so	much	as	they	are	aspects	or	functions	of	the	sign:	for	Peirce	semiosis	involves	accounting	for	how	each	of	these	functions	is	a	part	of	any	given	sign	we	encounter.	What	Guattari’s	positions	suggests,	on	these	definitions,	is	that	the	semiotic	of	signification	op-erates	solely	at	the	level	of	the	symbol,	and	what	Guattari	is	doing	is	trying	to	accommo-date	the	icon	and	the	index.	Among	many	semioticians,	linguists,	and	philosophers,	signs	that	are	«only»	icons,	indices,	or	mixes	of	the	two	are	often	not	considered	to	be	signs	and	are	rather	named	as	signals,	and,	as	Guattari	scholar	Gary	Genosko	puts	it,	Guattari	is	aim-ing	to	«rethink	and	regain	the	lowly	status	of	signals»	(Genosko	2009:	89).	Guattari	does	this	across	the	1970s	through	a	continually	refined,	but	generally	tripar-tite,	distinction	of	semiotics.	In	1973’s	«The	Role	of	the	Signifier	in	the	Institution»,	for	example,	Guattari	demarcates	1.	non-semiotic	encodings,	2.	signifying	semiologies	(sym-bolic	 and	 signification),	 and	 3.	 a-signifying	 semiologies,	 while	 1976’s	 «Meaning	 and	




Power»	distinguishes	1.	natural	encodings,	2.	icons,	and	3.	signifying	and	a-signifying	se-miotics.15	That	his	categorial	distinctions	undergo	subtle	shifts	 is	 indicative	of	 the	care	Guattari	takes	to	avoid	making	distinctions	that	are	too	final	or	absolute,	anticipating	his	and	Deleuze’s	claim	that	every	semiotic	is	ultimately	a	mixed	semiotic,	though	it	is	also	evidence	of	the	terminological	fluidity	–	and	sometimes	looseness	–	that	poses	a	hurdle	to	the	 interpretation	of	his	 thought.	 I	will	not	detail	 these	 categories	here	–	excellent	ac-counts	exist	elsewhere,	such	as	across	the	writings	of	Gary	Genosko	(2009)	and	 in	the	work	of	the	cultural	theorists	Lawrence	Grossberg	and	Bryan	Behrenshausen	(2016)	–	and	 for	now	will	 limit	myself	 to	picking	out	some	key	aspects	 for	my	argument	going	ahead.	When	discussing	natural	encodings,	or	non-semiotic	encodings,	Guattari	stresses	that	even	the	most	minimal	discursive	rendering	of	the	natural	realm	involves	a	translation	into	signs	(Guattari	1984c:	167).	Natural	encodings	themselves	are	not	yet	a	semiotic	sub-stance,	 and	as	 such	no	direct	 translation	 from	 this	system	 to	another	 system	can	 take	place.	This	is	suggestive	of	one	of	the	most	prominent	themes	of	Guattari’s	work	in	the	1970s,	namely	his	view	the	sciences	are	not	concerned	with	the	«discovery»	of	external	realities	as	such,	but	are	rather	always	creative	and	constructive	in	themselves,	producing	something	new	when	they	make	models	of	the	natural	world	(Guattari	1984b:	90).	This	kind	of	scientific	procedure	with	regards	to	natural	encodings,	alongside	what	he	names	the	«sign	machines»	of	economic,	musical,	or	artistic	«technico-semiotic	complexus»,	are	instances	of	what	Guattari	will	call	«a-signifying	semiotics»	(Guattari	1984a:	75).		But	care	should	be	taken	to	resist	any	too-hasty	distinction	between	a	negatively	con-strued,	repressive	signifying	semiotic	and	a	positively	construed,	liberatory	a-signifying	semiotics	–	that	in	«Meaning	and	Power»	it	seems	that	the	exemplary	«a-signifying	ma-chine»	is	capitalism	is	enough	to	suggest	a	more	complex	relation	(Guattari	1984b:	85).	These	 «a-signifying	 semiotics»	 are	 also	 named	 «post-signifying	 semiotics»	 (Guattari	1984a:	75),	and	should	not	be	understood	as	being	wholly	distinct	from	signification:	they	are	still	«based	on»	signifying	semiotics	and	«cannot	do	without	props	of	this	kind».	From	a	practical	perspective	we	could	envision	this	through	how,	for	example,	the	work	of	sci-ence	takes	place	in	state	or	even	corporate	institutions.	Despite	this,	Guattari	says	that	a-signifying	machines	use	signifying	semiotics	only	as	a	tool,	«an	instrument	of	semiotic	de-territorialization,	making	it	possible	for	the	semiotic	fluxes	to	form	new	connections	with	the	most	deterritorialized	material	 fluxes».	The	 intention	with	a-signifying	semiotics	is	thus	to	produce	a	new	relation	between	the	world	of	signs	and	the	world	of	things	(that	is,	the	material	world,	though	the	term	«material»	will	require	further	interrogation),	or	to	reinvest	in	this	relation	that	is	sidelined	and	obscured	by	signifying	semiotics.	








While	it	is	not	yet	clear	what	it	would	mean	to	«get	ahead	of»	deterritorialized	fluxes,	what	is	nevertheless	stressed	here	is	that	post-signifying	semiotics	has	an	important	crit-ical	element.	 It	remains	the	case	that	 there	 is	a	certain	proximity	between	the	 flows	of	capital	and	the	flows	of	pre-linguistic	desire	and	expression,	but	now	we	hear	that	while	«there	is	…	no	meaning	in	the	ups	and	downs	of	the	stock	market»,	capitalist	power	nev-ertheless	«seeks	to	control	the	non-signifying	semiotic	machines»	(Guattari	1984c:	171):	describing	capital	as	the	«model	of	models»,	Guattari	argues	that	the	function	of	capital-ism	consists	in	«reducing	the	multiplicities	of	desire	to	a	single	undifferentiated	flux	–	of	workers,	consumers,	etc.»	(Guattari	1984b:	85).	As	such	there	is	an	aspect	of	a-signifying	semiotics	that	resists	the	notion	that	what	this	term	implies	is	a	simple	immersion	into	the	flows	that	underlie	signification,	chief	among	them	the	flows	of	capital.	The	image	here	is	of	a-signifying	semiotics	as	a	critical	and	con-structive	procedure,	one	that	aims	to	disarticulate	semiotics	from	both	a	reliance	on	sig-nification	and	any	 faith	 in	a	pre-signifying	state.	To	articulate	 this	complex,	polyvalent	character	of	a-signifying	semiotics,	Guattari	turns	to	Peirce’s	notion	of	the	diagram.	As	noted,	 for	Peirce	the	diagram	is	a	 type	of	 icon.	When	explaining	what	an	 icon	 is,	Peirce	notes	that	photography	is	in	some	respects	instructive	insofar	as	a	photograph	can	be	seen	to	imitate	exactly	that	which	it	represents,	but	on	the	other	hand	photographs	are	«physically	forced	to	correspond	point	by	point	to	nature»,	a	characteristic	of	the	index	(Peirce	1998a:	6).	More	apt	when	speaking	of	icons	are	the	sketches	of	sculptors	or	paint-ers,	or	the	reasoning	of	mathematics,	with	likenesses	being	«the	very	hinges	of	the	gates	of	their	science».	 In	this	context,	the	diagram	is	a	particular	type	of	icon,	one	that	sup-presses	certain	features	of	the	object	it	refers	to	so	as	to	allow	the	mind	«more	easily	to	think	of	the	important	features»	(Guattari	1998b:	13).	This	suppression	can	be	to	the	ex-tent	that	the	diagram	can	resemble	its	object	«not	at	all	in	looks»	but	only	in	respect	to	the	relation	of	parts.	In	this	sense	for	Peirce	the	diagram	is	a	kind	of	likeness,	mental	or	physical,	that	allows	the	path	that	reasoning	should	take	to	be	more	easily	conceived.	While	the	icon	is	said	by	Peirce	to	have	«no	dynamical	connection	with	the	object	it	represents»	(Guattari	1998a:	9),	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	diagram,	such	as	 those	of	algebraic	
formulae,	it	can	be	said	to	have	the	«capacity	of	revealing	unexpected	truth»	(Peirce	1931-35:	2.279).	Guattari	is	not	as	concerned	with	reasoning	and	a	search	for	truth	as	Peirce	is,	but	it	is	nevertheless	something	like	this	aspect	of	the	diagram	that	interests	him.	Com-pared	to	the	image,	the	diagram	«far	more	efficiently	and	precisely»	includes	«the	articu-lations	whereby	a	system	operates»	(Guattari	1984c:	170),	but,	more	than	this,	Guattari	suggests	that	this	capacity	for	revealing,	or,	rather,	producing	the	unexpected	necessitates	separating	the	diagram	from	the	still-representational	figure	that	is	the	icon.16	




Guattari	refers	to	Peirce’s	assertion	that	algebraic	equations	are	diagrams,	suggesting	that	 they	 function	as	signs	«in	place	of	 the	objects	 they	relate	 to,	independently	of	any	effects	of	signification	that	may	exist	alongside	them»	(Guattari	1984c:	170-71).	But	how	he	is	differentiating	himself	from	Peirce	is	reflected	more	clearly	in	how	there	is	some-thing	not	entirely	satisfying	in	Peirce	using	the	example	of	a	sketch	for	a	painting	or	sculp-ture	when	describing	icons.	We	can	readily	affirm	that	a	certain	likeness	holds	between	a	painting	and	its	preparatory	sketch.	But	it	would	not	be	right	to	say	that	a	sketch	imitates	a	painting,	or	even	vice-versa.	In	the	first	case	this	is	simply	because	the	sketch	precedes	the	painting,	and	in	the	second	it	is	because,	while	the	painting	in	one	respect	imitates	the	sketch,	this	far	from	exhausts	the	relation	between	them.	It	seems	rather	that	the	sketch,	as	diagram,	is	taken	as	a	guide	or	catalyst	to	creating	something	that	was	not	present	in	the	diagram	itself,	something	unexpected.	As	such,	when	Guattari	is	conceiving	of	diagrams	he	does	not	understand	them	to	be	presenting	a	likeness	of	an	object	that	can	in	theory	be	fully	comprehended	by	the	mind.	They	should	rather	be	seen	to	be	bringing	about	a	process	that	has	no	necessary	direction	or	goal,	but	which	rather	takes	as	its	premise	only	to	make	«signs	work	flush	to	material	flows»	 (Guattari	1984b:	88,	 translation	modified;	Guattari	2012:	419;	 see	Alliez	2015:	145),	to	use	the	relational	detail	and	refinement	of	the	diagram	to	set	into	motion	sign-behaviours	that	evade	signification	and	modulate	material	 flows	themselves.	By	 losing	«aboutness»	as	a	criterion	for	the	diagram	and	giving	it	a	kind	of	ontological	primacy	as	the	sign	closest	to	the	real,	Guattari	can	bring	the	diagram	into	line	with	his	critique	of	representation	(Genosko	2009:	102).	Moreover,	the	diagram	can	be	utilised	in	departing	from	representation	insofar	as	it	can	be	deployed	to	extract	signs	from	their	representa-tional	and	signifying	uses,	and	put	them	into	contact	with	material	fluxes.	As	he	describes	this	in	the	final	version	of	his	semiotics	before	A	Thousand	Plateaus,	in	The	Machinic	Un-
conscious,	the	role	of	the	diagram	is	not	to	«denote»	a	fully	constituted	referent,	but	to	produce	it	(Guattari	2011:	216).	This	conception	of	the	diagram	allows	Guattari	to	finally	give	a	complete	account	of	the	«point-signs»	he	first	formulated	in	the	early	1960s,	now	also	referred	to	by	the	names	«part-signs»	and	«particle-signs».	As	he	will	later	put	it,	these	point-signs	do	not	«simply	secrete	significations»	but	constitute	a	«bringing	into	being»	(Guattari	1995:	49).	This	cre-ative	power	can	be	assigned	to	the	part-sign	due	to	it,	in	Guattari’s	words,	«elud[ing]	the	coordinates	of	time,	space	and	existence»	(Guattari	1984b:	84)	–	which	I	take	to	mean	that	they	precede	any	specific	signifying	regime	which	would	organise	spaces	and	times	 in	particular	ways,	that	is,	that	the	spaces	and	times	that	part-signs	work	within	are	not	pre-determined.	This	itself	is	possible,	using	a	term	that	takes	us	back	to	Simondon	and	that	is	used	by	both	Guattari	and	by	Deleuze	 in	his	 later	explication	of	 the	signs	of	cinema,	because	these	signs	consist	of	«signaletic	matter»	(Guattari	2013:	40;	Deleuze	1989:	29).17	In	this	conception	signs	are	not	neutral	and	static,	with	no	role	awaiting	them	but	their	




referential	use.	They	rather	maintain	something	intensive	and	plastic	to	them,	being	re-ducible	to	identifiable	individuals	only	temporarily	and	arbitrarily.	Where	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	two	extremely	different	accounts	of	signs	meet	is	that	they	are	both	intensive	theories	of	signs,	and	both	thinkers	put	extensive	work	into	free-ing	the	intensive	qualities	of	the	sign	from	its	static	articulation	in	the	representations	of	signifying	 semiotics.	 Peirce	 is	 useful	 again	 in	 suggesting	what	 a	 combination	 of	 their	thought	implies.	Where	Guattari	extracts	the	diagram	from	the	icon	as	a	non-representa-tional	motor	of	thought	and	practice,	Deleuze’s	binding	of	sign,	sensation,	and	encounter	recalls	 Peirce’s	description	 of	 the	 index	 as	 «[a]nything	which	 startles	…	 in	 so	 far	 as	 it	marks	the	junction	between	two	portions	of	experience.	Thus	a	tremendous	thunderbolt	indicates	that	something	considerable	happened,	though	we	may	not	know	precisely	what	the	event	was»	(Peirce	1998a:	8).	They	«shock»	us	out	of	our	habitual	ways	of	imagining	how	things	are,	they	force	us	to	«think	otherwise	than	we	have	been	thinking»	(Peirce	1931-35:	1.336).	The	question	now	is	of	how	these	two	aspects	come	to	relate,	and	I	will	propose	that	what	allows	for	this	relation	is	rhythm.			
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